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letions, the statute read: "A court of equity 
has jurisdiction over the ... visitation ... 
of a child. In exercising its jurisdiction, the 
court may . . . (4) Determine who shall 
have visitation rights to a child;" MD. 
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 
3-602 (a) (1976). The court stated: "On its 
face, therefore, section 3-604 (a) (4), prior 
to the 1981 amendment, constituted the 
broadest possible grant of authority to 
courts to determine who shall be awarded 
visitation rights." Evans v. Evans, 302 
Md. at 339, 488 A.2d at 159. 
The court then addressed the appellee's 
contention that jurisdiction over visitation 
must be construed narrowly in view of the 
1981 amendment specifically providing 
for grandparent's visitation rights. The 
basis for the appellee's argument was that 
the inclusion of a statutory provision spe-
cifically addressed to the visitation rights 
of grandparents was a legislative recogni-
tion of the need to protect these rights. In 
rejecting their argument, the court of ap-
peals noted a long line of case law previ-
ously recognizing the right of grandparents 
to custody and visitation rights. Powers v. 
Hadden, 30 Md. App. 577, 353 A.2d 641 
(1938). 
The thrust of the court's reasoning, how-
ever, seems to turn on its examination of 
the legislative history of the 1981 amend-
ment to Section 3-602 (a) (4). A four year 
effort had been present in the Maryland 
Legislature to enact legislation to guarantee 
visitation rights to grandparents. Evans, 
302 Md. at 339-43, 408 A.2d at 159-61. 
However these measures were repeatedly 
defeated on the grounds that the existing 
law adequately provided these rights. 
The court agreed with the analysis of a 
1984 decision by the court of appeals, 
Skeens v. Paterno, 60 Md. App. 48, 480 
A.2d 820(1984), wherein that court stated: 
"The legislative history contains no indi-
cation that the bill was intended as a limi-
tation on grandparental visitation or on 
anyone else's visitation - in other con-
texts ... " Id at 60-61, 480 A.2d at 826. 
The court's decision in Evans reaffirms 
the longstanding test which has governed 
Maryland custody and visitation cases, 
namely, what is in the best interests of the 
child. See Elza v. Elza, 300 Md. 51,475 
A.2d 1180 (1984); Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 
349,157 A.2d442 (1960); Carterv. Carter, 
156 Md. 500, 144 A. 490 (1929). Evans 
makes it clear that the Maryland courts 
have considerable discretion in determin-
ing who shall be awarded child visitation 
rights, and explicitly are not limited to nat-
ural or adoptive parents or grandparents. 
-M. Tracy Neuhauser 
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u.s. v. Johns: THE AUTOMOBILE 
EXCEPTION ONE STEP FURTHER 
The Supreme Court through Justice 
O'Connor in a 7-2 decision extended the 
rule of law of United States v. Ross, 456 
U.S. 798 (1982), which stated that once 
police officers have probable cause to 
search a lawfully stopped vehicle, they 
may open and search closed containers 
found within the vehicle that may conceal 
the object of their search. In United States 
v. Johns, 105 S.Ct. 881 (1985), the Su-
preme Court held that a search is not un-
reasonable, and therefore not violative of 
the fourth amendment, "merely" because 
the warrantless search of closed containers 
takes place several days after the contain-
ers are removed from the vehicles. 
In the course of an investigation of drug 
smuggling operations, custom agents by 
airborne and surface surveillance observed 
the rendezvous between several pickup 
trucks and an airplane at a remote airstrip 
50 miles from the Mexican border. At 
trial the surface agents stated that they 
could not see what transpired, but were 
told by airborne units that the trucks ap-
proached and parked near the small plane. 
The officers closed in on the trucks, ob-
served an individual covering the contain-
ers with a blanket, and smelled the odor 
of marihuana. In the back of the trucks 
were containers wrapped in dark green 
plastic and sealed with tape. The respon-
dents were then arrested. Neither the con-
tainers nor the trucks were searched at the 
scene but instead they were taken to the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
headquarters. The containers were un-
loaded from the trucks and placed in a 
DEA warehouse; three days later a war-
rantless search revealed the marihuana. 
At trial the respondents were successful 
in suppressing the evidence, and this was 
affirmed by the court of appeals, United 
States v. Johns, 707 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 
1983). 
The Court summarily disposed of the 
respondents first contention that the offi-
cer's probable cause to suspect contraband 
went to the containers not the vehicles. 
This distinction is important; if probable 
cause went to the containers, the rule in 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 
(1977), would invalidate the warrantless 
search as outside of the automobile excep-
tion first set forth in Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), but if the 
probable cause went to the vehicle, the· 
only issue is whether the rule in Ross, 
should apply to a three day delay in an 
otherwise lawful search. The Court did 
not disturb the findings of fact of the 
lower court and agreed that the officers 
had probable cause that not only the pack-
ages, but also the vehicle contained the 
drugs. See United States v. Johns, 707 F.2d 
1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1983). 
The Court appeared to break the case 
into two steps. First, that Ross, allowed 
police officers to open and search closed 
containers found in the execution of a 
warrantless automobile search. Second, 
that Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 
(1970), allowed vehicle searches at the po-
lice station that could have taken place at 
the place of the vehicle stop. Therefore, 
the Court simply stated, "as the Govern-
ment was entitled to seize the packages 
and could have searched them immedi-
ately without a warrant, we conclude that 
the warrantless search three days later ... 
was reasonable .... " Johns, 105 S.Ct. at 
887. 
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ute would provide a remedy to Adler since 
he made the report to the employer. Adop-
tion of a statute similar to those in Michi-
gan and Connecticut would not provide a 
remedy, since he did not report his sus-
picions to a public body; however, the 
statute could represent the clear mandate 
of public policy that is required by Adler. 
Further, the Michigan statute does not re-
quire that the employee actually report 
the alleged violation to a public body, but 
only that his discharge occurred and he 
"was about to report" the suspected viola-
tion. 19 The employee does not bear the 
burden of pleading the actual violation of 
law. 
Arguments against enactment of a 
Whistleblowers' statute include the basic 
business management position that a bus-
iness cannot properly or profitably oper-
ate if every employee has the right to sec-
ond guess the legality and/or morality of 
all management decisions. Simply stated, 
an employee who thinks that his employer 
is acting illegally should be so dissatisfied 
that he should terminate his employment 
unilaterally. Ideally, if an employee sus-
pects that the business is not operating 
legally, he should not want to be em-
ployed by that business. Realistically, fi-
nancial considerations of an individual 
employee may not allow him the luxury 
of such idealism. At the same time, an 
employee who has reported to supervisors 
that he believes that illegal activities are 
taking place must realize the risk that he 
is taking and expect that supervisors may 
question his loyalty to the employer. 
The employee, however, deserves the 
protection of a Whistleblowers' statute 
because job security is valuable, particu-
larly when unemployment is high. Ter-
mination may leave the employee with 
depressed job prospects when his only 
failing was the refusal to ignore what rea-
sonably appeared to him to be illegal 
practices of his employer. With the de-
mand for less government, the question 
arises of whether wrongful discharge or 
a Whistleblowers' statute infuse unneces-
sary governmental interference with pri-
vate industry. According to Adler, that 
question is answered by the balancing of 
the three interests: individual, business 
and society. The interest of society in en-
forcement ofits criminal laws may tip the 
scale in favor of the enactment of a Mary-
land Whistleblowers' statute. 
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The dissent of Justice Brennan, with 
whom Justice Marshall joined, stressed 
that the delay in the search removes any 
exigency that may impair reasonable ef-
forts to obtain a warrant. Accordingly, 
the dissent insisted that there lacked any 
of the justifications for not adhering to 
the fourteenth amendment's warrant re-
quirement. 
The Court's decision is dangerous be-
cause it shows a total disregard for that 
tenuous connection between rules and their 
justifications. The automobile exception 
was based on narrow justifications; the 
impracticality of obtaining a warrant on 
something as mobile as a vehicle, the dimin-
ished expectation of privacy, and the safety 
of law enforcement officers. But once a 
closed container is taken from the automo-
bile and placed in a warehouse, those justi-
fications have evaporated. Departing from 
the established justifications makes it easier 
for future courts to make further unsup-
ported extensions, which jeopardize the 
fourteenth and fourth amendments' protec-
tion against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 
In addition, by not narrowly applying 
the warrant requirement, the Court runs 
the risk that otherwise diligent police of-
ficers will momentarily become unob-
servant so that the stated focus of the 
search will be the vehicle, and not the 
package contained within the vehicle. 
This momentary lapse removes the search 
from United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 
1 (1977) which states that if the suspicion 
is focused on the closed container, a war-
rant is required, and puts it within United 
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). This 
becomes an unwise rule when it rewards 
otherwise trivial differences in police sur-
veillance by dispensing with the warrant 
requirement. A better position would be to 
resist the temptation to extend the automo-
bile exception, and limit the exceptions to 
the warrant requirement to those within 
the ambit of the original justifications. 
-Michael Burgoyne 
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